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NOTES
THE PRESENT STATUS OF AN
INTERLOCKING CONFESSION
EXCEPTION TO BRUTON V. UNITED
STATES
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1968, the United States Supreme Court held in Bruton v.
United States" that the admission of a nontestifying codefend-
ant's confession, which implicated another defendant at a joint
trial, violated the implicated defendant's sixth amendment right
of confrontation. The Court concluded that such a violation oc-
curred even when the trial court clearly instructed the jury that
the codefendant's statement could not be considered against the
defendant. Eleven years after Bruton, the Court attempted un-
successfully in Parker v. Randolph2 to decide whether the
Bruton rule3 applies if an implicated defendant has himself
made a confession. The Court was evenly divided4 as to whether
error occurs when a nontestifying codefendant's incriminating
1. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
2. 442 U.S. 62 (1979).
3. See generally ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO JOINDER AND SEVERANCE § 2.3(a)
(1968). Section 2.3(a) states,
When a defendant moves for a severance because an out-of-court statement of
a codefendant makes reference to him but is not admissible against him, the
court should determine whether the prosecution intends to offer the statement
in evidence at the trial. If so, the court should require the prosecuting attorney
to elect one of the following courses:
(i) a joint trial at which the statement is not admitted into evidence;
(ii) a joint trial at which the statement is admitted into evidence only
after all references to the moving defendant have been effectively de-
leted; or
(iii) severance of the moving defendant.
ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO JOINDER AND SEVERANCE § 2.3(a)(1968).
4. Justice Powell did not participate in the Parker decision.
659
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confession is admitted during a joint trial at which the com-
plaining defendant's own confession is also before the jury.
The Parker plurality opinion5 held that when the com-
plaining defendant's own confession is properly before the jury,
the jury can be relied upon to follow a limiting instruction that
any statement by a nontestifying defendant may be considered
only against its maker." Thus, the plurality distinguished the
"interlocking confession" situation 7 from the Bruton situation in
which the confessing defendant does not testify and the impli-
cated defendant has made no extrajudicial admission of guilt.
The Parker plurality stated that, in Bruton situations, "limiting
instructions cannot be accepted as adequate to safeguard the de-
fendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause."'
Although concurring in the plurality's result, Justice Black-
mun rejected the per se rule that Bruton is inapplicable in an
interlocking confession situationY Justice Blackmun preferred to
apply the Court's established harmless error analysis to cases in-
volving the admission of a confession by a nontestifying code-
fendant. 10 Justice Blackmun rejected the plurality's determina-
tion that no error occurs when a codefendant's incriminating
statement is admitted at trial. The dissent" agreed with Justice
Blackmun that a harmless error analysis should be used, but
concluded that the error in Parker was not in fact harmless.
The Supreme Court apparently granted certiorari in Parker
to provide guidance to the lower courts which had been divided
on the appropriate constitutional analysis to be used in inter-
locking confession cases.' 2 The Court itself, however, was evenly
5, Justice Rehnquist wrote the plurality opinion and was joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Stewart and White.
6. 442 U.S. at 74.
7. Few courts have focused on the definitional requirements of an "interlocking con-
fession." See infra text accompanying notes 79-82, 114-15. At a minimum, however, an
interlocking confession involves a self-incriminating statement by a defendant and a
statement by a codefendant which also incriminates the defendant.
8. 442 U.S. at 74.
9. Id. at 77-79.
10. Id. See Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
11. Justice Stevens wrote the dissent and was joined by Justices Brennan and
Marshall.
12. See, e.g., Mack v. Maggio, 538 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1979)(Bruton rule not applica-
ble when guilt of accused is established beyond a reasonable doubt by his own confes-
sion); Metropolis v. Turner, 437 F.2d 207, 208-09 (10th Cir. 1971)("We need not concern
ourselves with the legal nicety as to whether the instant case [involving 'paralleling con-
660 [Vol. 36
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divided on the fundamental issue of whether the admission of a
nontestifying codefendant's "interlocking confession" was a
sixth amendment violation. Whatever else the Parker opinions
may have accomplished, they did not supply the lower courts
with a binding principle of constitutional interpretation. The
post-Parker reaction by the lower courts has varied. As will be
shown in a later section of this Note, many courts have followed
Justice Blackmun and the dissenters' harmless error analysis.
Other courts, following the Parker plurality opinion as if it were
binding precedent, have adopted the interlocking confession ex-
ception to the Bruton rule. One court has suggested that the
Parker plurality view conflicts with Bruton and its progeny,
which are undoubtedly binding precedent on inferior courts.13
This court suggests that the plurality view not only lacks prece-
dential value, but may also be unconstitutional. 14
The disagreement among both federal and state jurisdic-
tions has increased, rather than decreased, since the Court's pro-
nouncements in Parker. This Note will review the relevant Su-
preme Court case law that culminated in Parker. It will also
examine the effect of the post-Parker confusion on the protec-
tion of defendants' rights of confrontation in joint trials.
II. THE SUPREME COURT CASE LAW: To WHAT EXTENT ARE
LIMITING INSTRUCTIONS AN ADEQUATE SAFEGUARD OF A
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION?
It is well established that a defendant's sixth amendment
right of confrontation 15 includes the defendant's right to cross-
examine any witness against him." It necessarily follows that in
the context of a joint trial, the confession of a codefendant
which incriminates another defendant is not admissible against
that defendant absent an opportunity to cross-examine the con-
fessions' by two codefendants] is 'without' the Bruton rule, or is 'within' Bruton with the
violation thereof constituting only harmless error."); People v. Ignacio, 413 F.2d 513 (9th
Cir. 1969) (case against defendant was so overwhelming that Bruton violation was harm-
less beyond a reasonable doubt), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 943 (1970).
13. See Earhart v. State, 48 Md. App. 695, 429 A.2d 557 (1981).
14. Id. at 704, 429 A.2d at 564.
15. In relevant part, the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution pro-
vides that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him .. " U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
16. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
1985]
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fessor. Equally well established is the principle that juries must
be relied upon to follow any and all instructions by the court.
Consequently, prior to Bruton v. United States,7 the Supreme
Court had relied on jury instructions to safeguard the confronta-
tion rights of an implicated defendant. So long as the jury was
clearly instructed that it was allowed to consider the confession
only against its maker, and not against any other defendant,
such confessions were admissible.1
8
In 1957 a closely divided Supreme Court in Delli Paoli v.
United States's considered whether limiting instructions suffi-
ciently protected defendant Delli Paoli when a codefendant's
confession, which clearly implicated him, was admitted at trial.
20
The Delli Paoli majority premised its decision on its observation
that "unless we proceed on the basis that the jury will follow the
court's instructions where those instructions are clear and the
circumstances are such that the jury can reasonably be expected
to follow them, the jury system makes little sense."'" Under the
facts and circumstances of Delli Paoli, the Court determined
that the trial court's instructions to the jury were especially
clear 22 and that it was reasonable to presume that those instruc-
tions were followed by the jury.23 Although the Delli Paoli mea-
17. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
18. Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232 (1957).
19. 352 U.S. 232 (1957). Delli Paoli was a 5:4 decision with Justice Frankfurter,
joined by Justices Black, Douglas and Brennan, writing in dissent.
20. Id. at 239.
21. Id. at 242.
22. Id. at 239-42. The instruction of the trial court in Delli Paoli was as follows:
The proof of the Government has now been completed except for the testi-
mony of the witness Greenberg as to the alleged statement or affidavit of the
defendant Whitley. This affidavit or admission will be considered by you solely
in connection with your determination of the guilt or innocence of the defen-
dant Whitley. It is not to be considered as proof in connection with the guilt or
innocence of any of the other defendants.
The reason for this distinction is this: An admission by defendant after his
arrest of participation in alleged crime may be considered as evidence by the
jury against him, together with other evidence, because it is, as the law de-
scribes it, an admission against interest which a person ordinarily would not
make. However, if such defendant after his arrest implicates other defendants
in such an admission it is not evidence against those defendants because as to
them it is nothing more than hearsay evidence.
Id. at 239-40,
23. Id. at 241. The Court expressly relied on several factors in favor of this pre-
sumption: (1) the crime charged was simple in nature and evidentiary restrictions were
few; (2) the separate interests of each defendant were emphasized throughout the trial;
4
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jority recognized that "there may be practical limitations to the
circumstances under which a jury should be left to follow in-
structions," '24 it did not find that the facts and circumstances of
Delli Paoli presented such a case.
The dissent, however, determined that such practical limita-
tions had been reached in Delli Paoli. Justice Frankfurter, writ-
ing in dissent, focused on the dilemma raised in joint trials when
an incriminating declaration is admissible against one or more of
the defendants but not admissible against others.2 5 The dissent
found that the majority's resolution of this dilemma, which was
to admit the declaration as evidence against the declarant with
instructions to the jury that the declaration could not be used in
determining the guilt of others, was "intrinsically ineffective in
that too often such a nonadmissible declaration cannot be wiped
from the brains of the jurors. The admonition therefore becomes
a futile collocation of words and fails of its purpose as a legal
protection to defendants against whom such a declaration
should not tell.
'26
It is unlikely that the majority in Delli Paoli maintained
any sincere belief in the jury's capacity to disregard the code-
fendant's statement during the guilt-determining process. More
() no defendant requested a separate trial; (4) the trial court postponed the admission
of the defendant's confession until the end of the government's case, thus making it
easier for the jury to consider the confession apart from the other evidence; (5) for the
most part the incriminating confession merely corroborated other evidence against Delli
Paoli; and finally, (6) there was an absence of anything in the record "indicating that the
jury was confused or that it failed to follow the court's instructions." Id. at 242.
24. Id. at 243.
25. As stated in the dissent:
It may well be that where such a declaration only glancingly, as it were,
affects a co-defendant who cannot be charged with the admitted declaration,
the rule enforced by the Court in this case does too little harm not to leave its
application to the discretion of the trial judge. But where the conspirator's
statement is so damning to another against whom it is inadmissible, as is true
in this case, the difficulty of introducing it against the declarant without inevi-
table harm to a co-conspirator, the petitioner in this case, is no justification for
causing such harm. The Government should not have the windfall of having
the jury be influenced by evidence against a defendant which, as a matter of
law, they should not consider but which they cannot put out of their minds.
After all, the prosecution could use the confession against the confessor and at
the same time avoid such weighty unfairness against a defendant who cannot
be charged with the declaration by not trying all the co-conspirators in a single
trial.
Id. at 247-48.
26. Id. at 247 (emphasis added).
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probably, the majority was swayed by a combination of factors
including a belief that the admission of the codefendant's state-
ment was harmless error2 7 or, possibly, a belief that the jury's
consideration of such statements was generally an aid to the
truth-seeking purpose of a trial.28 Finally, the Delli Paoli major-
ity was understandably reluctant to depart from the appellate
presumption that juries must be relied upon to follow instruc-
tions from the court. As will be discussed below, the blurring of
the distinction between harmless error and no error at all, re-
flected in the Delli Paoli majority opinion, has plagued many
later judicial decisions.29
Regardless of the true basis for the majority decision in
Delli Paoli, the Supreme Court overruled itself eleven years
later in Bruton v. United States.30 Justice Brennan, writing for
the Bruton majority,31 rejected Delli Paoli's assumption that an
encroachment on the defendant's confrontation rights could be
avoided by giving jury instructions to disregard the codefend-
ant's statement as it applied to the defendant. The Court in
Bruton held that limiting instructions, no matter how clear,
were not an adequate substitute for a defendant's right of con-
frontation.32 The Court recognized that "there are some contexts
27. The majority in Delli Paoli expressly determined that the jury could have found,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was guilty as charged. 352 U.S. at 236. In
addition, the Second Circuit had reached the same conclusion in the earlier disposition
in United States v. Delli Paoli, 229 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1956). There, the court stated,
"[Tihe possibility that unless he [Delli Paoli] were a party to the venture, Pierro and
Margiano would have associated [with] him to the extent we have mentioned is too re-
mote for serious discussion." 229 F.2d 319, 320 (2d Cir. 1956), quoted in Delli Paoli, 352
U.S. at 236.
28. The genesis of this belief may lie in a statement made by Judge L. Hand in
Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1932). Judge Hand wrote,
There is no reason why the prosecution, if it chooses to indict several defen-
dants together, should not be confined to evidence admissible against all, and
if real injustice were done, the result would be undesirable. In effect, however,
the rule probably furthers, rather than impedes, the search for truth, and this
perhaps excuses the device which satisfies form while it violates substance;
that is, the recommendation to the jury of a mental gymnastic which is be-
yond, not only their powers, but anybody's else.
Id. at 1007. Judge Hand later authored the majority opinion in United States v. Delli
Paoli, 229 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1956).
29. See infra notes 86, 99, 113 and accompanying text.
30. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
31. Justices White and Harlan dissented from the majority opinion. Justice Black
concurred for the reasons stated in his Delli Paoli dissent.
32. Id. at 137.
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in which the risks that the jury will not, or cannot, follow in-
structions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to
the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the
jury system cannot be ignored.1
33
Four years earlier, the Supreme Court in Jackson v.
Denno34 had first found limiting instructions ineffective as a
safeguard to a defendant's right against self-incrimination. In
Jackson, the Court recognized the futility of expecting a jury to
follow instructions that it first determine the voluntariness of a
defendant's confession and then disregard the confession en-
tirely if it were found to be involuntary. The Court held that
such a procedure did not provide a reliable determination of the
voluntariness of a confession, and thus did not adequately pro-
tect a defendant's right to be free of a conviction based upon a
coerced confession.3 5 The core of the Jackson decision was an
unwillingness to entrust to the jury the "exceedingly sensitive
task" of determining the voluntariness of a defendant's confes-
sion.3 6 Similarly, in Bruton, the majority doubted the jury's abil-
ity to disregard a nontestifying codefendant's confession to the
extent that it incriminated another defendant.37 The Court in
both Jackson and Bruton concluded that this inability of the
jury could in certain instances result in a denial of a constitu-
tionally guaranteed right.
The Bruton majority also relied to a certain extent on the
33. Id. at 135.
34. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
35. Id. at 377.
36. Id. at 429 (Harlan, J. dissenting).
37. Although Jackson and Bruton are similar in their express recognition of the
jury's inability to follow certain instructions by the trial court, it is worth noting that
Justice White, who wrote the majority opinion in Jackson, wrote a dissent in Bruton,
391 U.S. 123, 138 (1968). He distinguished the two situations on the basis of the devas-
tating effect of the defendant's own confession and the fact that an involuntary confes-
sion is excluded not because it is untrue but in order to protect other constitutional
values. Id. at 139-43. In contrast, Justice White determined that a nontestifying code-
fendant's confession is inadmissible against a defendant because it is not reliable. Id. at
142. Justice White believed that a jury could understand and follow instructions to disre-
gard a codefendant's confession to the extent it incriminated another defendant because
they would recognize such evidence as inherently unreliable. In contrast a jury would not
be able to understand the rationale behind the instruction not to consider an involuntary
confession and thus the jury would be unable to follow any such instruction, thereby
depriving the defendant of his recognized constitutional right.
1985] 665
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inherent unreliability of extrajudicial codefendant statements.38
Certainly, an accused often attempts to shift blame away from
himself in statements made to the police. The Court's concern in
Bruton with both the jury's ability to follow limiting instructions
and the reliability of a codefendant's statement as it relates to
the culpability of another, foreshadowed the exception to
Bruton later espoused by the Parker plurality.3 9 In part, the
Parker plurality distinguished Bruton on the basis of the greater
reliability of a codefendant's confession that is corroborated by
the defendant's own confession.
The Court held Bruton to be retroactive. 40 Although the
Court recognized that retroactive application of Bruton might
have considerable impact on decided cases, it deemed retroactiv-
ity necessary on the ground that the constitutional error found
in Bruton presented "a serious risk that the issue of guilt or in-
nocence may not have been reliably determined.
'41
A year after Bruton, in Harrington v. California,42 the Su-
preme Court held that a violation of Bruton could be harmless
error. 4  The majority in Harrington determined that the evi-
dence against the defendant was so overwhelming that the state
conviction should be reversed only if the Court concluded that
no Bruton violation could constitute harmless error." This the
38. 391 U.S. at 136.
39. See infra Section A of Part III.
40. Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968). The court stated: "We have. . . retroac-
tively applied rules of criminal procedure fashioned to correct serious flaws in the fact-
finding process at trial. Despite the cautionary instruction, the admission of a defend-
ant's confession which implicates a codefendant results in such a 'serious flaw.'" Id. at
294 (quoting Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 298 (1966))(citations omitted).
41. Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293, 295 (1968).
42. 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
43. Id. at 253.
44. Id. at 254. Harrington is significant not only in the context of the sixth amend-
ment, but also in its effect on harmless error review by federal courts. In Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), the Supreme Court held for the first time that constitu-
tional error could be harmless. The standard of review proposed by the Court in Chap-
man was to place on the beneficiary of the error, i.e., the state, the burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt that the constitutional error did not contribute to the verdict.
In contrast, the Court in Harrington determined that the properly admitted evidence
was so "overwhelming" that the violation of Bruton was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. Thus the Court lessened the burden of proof on the state, and shifted the harm-
less error inquiry "from whether the constitutional error contributed to the conviction to
whether the untainted evidence provided 'overwhelming' support for the conviction."
Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 255 (1969)(Brennan, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 36
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Supreme Court was unwilling to do.
Until the plurality opinion in Parker v. Randolph, the Su-
preme Court had consistently applied a harmless error analysis
to the Bruton violations that came before the Court.45 The ques-
tion raised in Parker was whether Bruton required that the con-
viction of a defendant who has himself confessed be reversed
when the complaining defendant's confession "interlocks" with
and supports the confession of his codefendant.4 6 As noted in
Justice Blackmun's concurrence, the conviction in Parker could
have been upheld by using the Court's traditional harmless error
analysis.47 Instead, however, the plurality chose to affirm the
conviction on the ground that it is constitutionally permissible
to admit a nontestifying codefendant's confession that impli-
cates another defendant when proper limiting instructions are
given and the jury has before it an "interlocking confession"
made by the defendant himself.
Thus, the critical distinction between the Parker plurality's
opinion and those of the concurrence and dissent is whether lim-
iting instructions are a sufficient safeguard of a defendant's sixth
amendment rights when the defendant has himself made an in-
terlocking confession. 48 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the plural-
ity, characterized Bruton as an exception to the general rule that
juries can be trusted to follow instructions by the court.49 Per-
haps the crux of the plurality rationale was its determination
that it is "entirely reasonable to apply the general rule, and not
the Bruton exception, when the defendant's case has already
been devastated by his own extrajudicial confession of guilt."50
Arguably, the Parker plurality holding depends not on any ex-
pectation that a jury faced with interlocking confessions will, in
fact, be able to consider each confession only with respect to its
maker, but on a belief that the confessing defendant will not be
harmed by a codefendant's confession which merely corroborates
45. See Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973); Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S.
427 (1972).
46. Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 64 (1979).
47. Id. at 77.
48. Id. at 74, 77, 81-82. This was the same issue that separated the dissent and
majority opinions in Deli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232 (1957). See supra text
accompanying notes 19-29.
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his own."' The distinction is significant.
III. Parker v. Randolph: A DIVIDED SUPREME COURT CONFIRMS
THE SPLIT OF OPINION IN THE LOWER COURTS OVER WHETHER
NONTESTIFYING CODEFENDANT INTERLOCKING CONFESSIONS MAY
BE ADMITTED IN A JOINT TRIAL
As outlined above, the Supreme Court in Bruton made clear
to the lower courts that limiting instructions do not sufficiently
protect a defendant's sixth amendment rights when an incrimi-
nating statement by a nontestifying codefendant is admitted
into evidence in a joint trial. The same year that Bruton was
decided, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held in United
States ex rel. Catanzaro v. Mancusi 52 that Bruton did not apply
to situations in which the jury had heard not only the codefend-
ant's confession implicating the defendant, but also the de-
fendant's own self-incriminating confession.
The court in Catanzaro appears to have originated what is
now known as the interlocking confession doctrine. The court
developed this doctrine in the following two paragraphs of its
decision:
The reasoning of ... Bruton is not persuasive here.
[Bruton] involved a defendant who did not confess and who
was tried along with a codefendant who did. In our case Catan-
zaro himself confessed and his confession interlocks with and
supports the confession of McChesney.
Where the jury has heard not only a codefendant's confes-
sion but the defendant's own confession no such "devastating"
risk attends the lack of confrontation as was thought to be in-
volved in Bruton.53
In the wake of Catanzaro and Bruton, the federal courts di-
vided on the question of whether Bruton need be applied in
51. The right protected by Bruton-the "constitutional right of cross-examina-
tion"-has far less practical value to a defendant who has confessed to the
crime than to one who has consistently maintained his innocence. Successfully
impeaching a codefendant's confession on cross-examination would likely yield
small advantage to the defendant whose own admission of guilt stands before
the jury unchallenged.
Id. at 73 (citation omitted).
52. 404 F.2d 296, 300 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 942 (1970).
53. 404 F.2d at 300.
[Vol. 36
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cases involving interlocking confessions.5 4 It was to resolve this
split of authority that the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Parker. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court was of two minds on
the issue and resolved nothing for the lower courts. This section
looks in some detail at the two analyses proposed by the Court.
A. The Parker Plurality: An Attempt to Adopt an
Interlocking Confession Exception to Bruton
Although the Parker plurality took more than two
paragraphs to develop a rationale in support of the interlocking
confession doctrine, it agreed with the basic premise of the court
in Catanzaro that Bruton is distinguishable from the interlock-
ing confession situation. The Court in Parker saw the basis for
the Bruton rule as lying in the "devastating consequences" to a
nonconfessing defendant of a jury's failure to follow an instruc-
tion to disregard a codefendant's incriminating statement.",
Both the Parker plurality and the court in Catanzaro contrasted
Bruton with the interlocking confession case, in which the jury
has before it the most devastating of all evidence, the defen-
dant's own confession.
56
The Parker plurality further distinguished Bruton by not-
ing that-a codefendant's confession is less suspect in the Parker
situation in which the incriminating defendant has "corrobo-
rated his codefendant's statements by heaping blame onto him-
self. '5 7 Finally, the Court distinguished Bruton by suggesting
that the constitutional right of cross examination protected by
Bruton "has far less practical value to a defendant who has con-
fessed to the crime than to one who has consistently maintained
his innocence."5"
Having distinguished Bruton in terms of actual harm to the
defendant and the relative reliability of a codefendant's confes-
54. See Parker, 442 U.S. at 68 n.4.
55. See id. at 72-73. "The possible prejudice resulting from the failure of the jury to
follow the trial court's instructions is not so 'devastating' or 'vital' to the confessing de-
fendant to require departure from the general rule allowing admission of evidence with
limiting instructions." Id. at 74-75; Catanzaro, 404 F.2d at 300.
56. In this respect the Parker plurality relied in part on Justice White's dissent in
Bruton. See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 139-40 (White, J., dissenting).
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sion, the Parker plurality proceeded to focus on the "crucial as-
sumption underlying [a system of trial by jury] that juries will
follow the instructions given them by the trial judge. ' 59 Al-
though the plurality acknowledged that in a Bruton situation s°
limiting instructions are not an adequate safeguard of a defen-
dant's rights under the confrontation clause, it held that the ad-
mission of an interlocking confession with proper limiting in-
structions was constitutional. As stated by the plurality:
Under [the circumstances of Bruton], the "practical and
human limitations of the jury system" override the theoreti-
cally sound premise that a jury will follow the trial court's in-
structions. But when the defendant's own confession is prop-
erly before the jury, we believe that the constitutional scales
tip the other way. The possible prejudice resulting from the
failure of the jury to follow the trial court's instructions is not
so "devastating" or "vital" to the confessing defendant to re-
quire departure from the general rule allowing admission of ev-
idence with limiting instructions."1
The reasoning of the Parker plurality appears to be based
on two distinct propositions. First, a jury in a Parker situation is
more likely to follow the trial court's instruction to consider a
confession only against its maker when it simultaneously incrim-
inates another defendant. Second, a defendant who has himself
confessed is harmed less by the jury's failure to follow the in-
struction than is a defendant who has consistently maintained
his innocence.6 2 Thus, a nonconfessing defendant has a much
greater stake than a confessing defendant in retaining his right
to confront the witnesses against him.
As suggested above, the Supreme Court expressed two justi-
fications for the Bruton rule: (1) the risk that, even with clear
limiting instructions, a jury would be unable to disregard a non-
testifying codefendant's confession as it incriminated another
59. Id. at 73. Interestingly, the Court's language at this point is highly reminiscent
of Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 242 (1957). In fact the Parker plurality
expressly relied on Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84 (1954), which was implicitly over-
ruled by Bruton. See infra note 63.
60. As represented by the plurality, a Bruton situation is one in which the "confess-
ing codefendant has chosen not to take the stand and the implicated defendant has
made no extrajudicial admission of guilt." 442 U.S. at 74.
61. Id. at 74-75 (citation omitted).
62. See supra text accompanying note 39.
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defendant; and (2) the potentially devastating effect of the
jury's failure to do so. Perhaps the most reasonable interpreta-
tion of the Parker plurality opinion is that absent one of the
justifications for the Bruton rule, Bruton simply does not ap-
ply." There is, however, an analytical problem with this inter-
pretation. Given the Court's acknowledgment in Bruton that the
jury cannot reasonably be relied upon to disregard entirely one
codefendant's confession as it incriminates another defendant,
the plurality opinion may be read as saying, in effect, that al-
though the defendant's sixth amendment right is violated by his
inability to cross-examine the codefendant, the defendant is not
likely to be harmed by this inability; therefore, there is no sixth
amendment violation. This analysis contrasts sharply with those
of Justice Blackmun's concurrence and the dissenters. Those
analyses admit that a sixth amendment error exists in the
Parker situation, but go on to inquire whether that error is
harmless.6
4
The primary advantage to recognizing the interlocking con-
fession exception, as the Parker plurality did, is that it allows a
trial court to assess in a forthright manner the issue of severance
in a case involving codefendants' interlocking confessions. In-
stead of speculating on the possible harm of the error, the trial
court can focus on the codefendants' statements to see if they
are in fact interlocking. Under the Parker plurality view, the
trial court would commit no error by admitting nontestifying co-
defendant confessions so long as they are "interlocking" and the
jury is properly instructed that the respective confessions can
63. Another reading of Parker is that the plurality attempted to diminish Bruton
and to return eventually to the holding of Delli Paoli. This reading is supported in part
by the plurality's reliance on Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84 (1954), for the proposi-
tion that "an instruction directing the jury to consider a codefendant's extrajudicial
statement only against its source has been found sufficient to avoid offending the con-
frontation right of the implicated defendant in numerous decisions of this Court." 442
U.S. at 73-74.
However, Opper, while not expressly overruled by Bruton, was clearly overruled by
implication, at least as it related to any sixth amendment issue. In Opper, the "clear and
repeated admonitions to the jury. . . that [the codefendant's] incriminatory statements
were not to be considered in establishing the guilt of the petitioner" and the fact that
"[o]ur theory of trial relies upon the ability of a jury to follow instructions" were suffi-
cient reason for the Supreme Court in 1954 to find no error. 348 U.S. at 95. In contrast,
the holding in Bruton was that limiting instructions, no matter how clear, are an inade-
quate substitute for a defendant's right of confrontation. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 137.
64. 442 U.S. at 80-82.
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only be considered against their makers.
One major shortcoming of the Parker plurality opinion is its
failure to define the term "interlocking confession." As will be
more fully developed in Section B of Part IV, subsequent courts
have required as little as an "incriminating statement" on the
part of a complaining defendant, and as much as substantially
equal statements by codefendants, to trigger the Parker excep-
tion to Bruton.
B. The Parker Concurrence and Dissent
Although the concurring and dissenting opinions differed as
to whether harmless error did in fact exist in Parker,5 they were
in complete agreement as to the continued vitality of the harm-
less error standard of review in all cases involving the admission
at trial of a nontestifying codefendant's statement incriminating
another defendant. In his concurrence, Justice Blackmun recog-
nized that error in most interlocking confession cases would be
harmless, 6 but concluded that merely because the codefendants'
"confessions may interlock to some degree does not ensure, as a
per se matter, that their admission will not prejudice a defend-
ant so substantially that a limiting instruction will not be
curative.
67
The concurring opinion questioned the potential impact of
the plurality's decision. Justice Blackmun speculated that the
interlocking confession doctrine might merely signify a shift in
inquiry."8 Unlike the harmless error analysis, which focuses on
the effect of a Bruton violation, the interlocking confession ex-
ception inquires whether the confessions were sufficiently inter-
locking to permit a conclusion that Bruton does not apply. Ei-
ther analysis would produce the same result. However, Justice
Blackmun noted that the plurality simply presumed the exis-
tence of an interlock.6 9 He criticized the plurality opinion, stat-
ing that it came "close to saying that so long as all the defen-
65. See id. at 80 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 81-82 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The finding by the district and circuit courts that the Bruton error in Parker was not
harmless should preclude the Court from reaching a different result. Id. at 81 n.1.
66. 442 U.S. at 79.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 80.
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dants have made some type of confession which is placed in
evidence, Bruton is inapplicable without inquiry into whether
the confessions actually interlock and the extent thereof.
'70
The dissent shared Justice Blackmun's concern over the
scope of the exception to Bruton that was proposed by the plu-
rality. The dissent questioned whether the plurality's attempt to
"create a vaguely defined exception for cases in which there is
evidence that the defendant has also made inculpatory state-
ments which he does not repudiate at trial"71 was compatible
with the Court's prior rulings.7 2 The dissent distinguished cases
in which the defendant's own confession constitutes convincing
evidence of his guilt from cases in which the defendant's confes-
sion was not conclusive on the question of guilt." The dissent
70. Id.
71. Id. at 82. Interestingly, the dissent's assumption that the interlocking confession
doctrine would be limited to cases in which the defendant had failed to repudiate his
own confession has proved unwarranted. See, e.g., Damon v. State, 397 So. 2d 1224, 1226
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)("The interlocking confession doctrine, however, has full vital-
ity even when the defendant's admissions are themselves challenged at the trial.").
72. 442 U.S. at 83 n.3.
73. Id. at 82. Justice Stevens used the following example to illustrate the potentially
devastating effect of a codefendant's confession on a case in which the defendant's own
"confession" is not convincing evidence of the defendant's guilt:
Suppose a prosecutor has 10 items of evidence tending to prove that de-
fendant X and codefendant Y are guilty of assassinating a public figure. The
first is the tape of a televised interview with Y describing in detail how he and
X planned and executed the crime. Items 2 through 9 involve circumstantial
evidence of a past association between X and Y, a shared hostility for the vic-
tim, and an expressed wish for his early demise-evidence that in itself might
very well be insufficient to convict X. Item 10 is the testimony of a drinking
partner, a former cellmate, or a divorced spouse of X who vaguely recalls X
saying that he had been with Y at the approximate time of the killing. Neither
X nor Y takes the stand.
If Y's televised confession were placed before the jury while Y was immu-
nized from cross-examination, it would undoubtedly have the "devastating" ef-
fect on X that the Bruton rule was designed to avoid. As Mr. Justice Stewart's
characteristically concise explanation of the underlying rationale in that case
demonstrates, it would also plainly violate X's Sixth Amendment right to con-
front his accuser. Nevertheless, under the plurality's first remarkable assump-
tion, the prejudice to X-and the violation of his constitutional right-would
be entirely cured by the subsequent use of evidence of his own ambiguous
statement. In my judgment, such dubious corroboration would enhance, rather
than reduce, the danger that the jury would rely on Y's televised confession
when evaluating X's guilt. Even if I am wrong, however, there is no reason to
conclude that the prosecutor's reliance on item 10 would obviate the harm
flowing from the use of item 1.
442 U.S. at 84-85 (citations and footnote omitted).
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asserted that in many cases the defendant's own confession was
no more reliable than other kinds of evidence, such as finger
prints or eyewitness testimony, and that "if these types of cor-
roboration are given the same absolute effect that the plurality
would accord confessions, the Bruton rule would almost never
apply." 4
The dissent also criticized the plurality for relying on two
erroneous assumptions. First, the plurality assumes that it is
reasonable to rely on the jury's ability to disregard the codefend-
ant's incriminating statement when that statement is at least
partially corroborated by the defendant's statement. Second, it
assumes that all unchallenged confessions by a defendant are
equally reliable. 5
Before attempting to evaluate the relative merits of an in-
terlocking confession exception to Bruton and the continued use
of harmless error review in all situations involving the admission
of an incriminating statement by a nontestifying codefendant, it
may be useful to examine how the lower courts have reacted to
Parker and how the interlocking confession doctrine has devel-
oped in practice.
IV. POsT-Parker: THE REACTION BY THE LOWER COURTS
A. The Federal Courts
Only the Second Circuit, which orginated the interlocking
confession exception to Bruton, and the Eleventh Circuit 6 have
wholeheartedly accepted the Parker plurality analysis. Several
circuits have rejected the Parker plurality reasoning and have
chosen instead to follow the harmless error analysis set forth in
Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion. The Seventh Circuit saw
no need to choose between the two analyses since it would find
no reversible error under either standard. In short, the division
of authority, which presumably led the Supreme Court to grant
certiorari in Parker, has in no way diminished since the Court
handed down its own divided opinion.
74. Id. at 86.
75. Id. at 84.
76. See United States v. Kroesser, 731 F.2d 1509 (11th Cir. 1984).
77. See Montes v. Jenkins, 626 F.2d 584 (7th Cir. 1980).
674 [Vol. 36
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The Second Circuit, which presaged the Parker plurality's
interlocking confession doctrine,7 s has the most extensive case
law on the issue.79 In determining whether an interlocking con-
fession exists in a case, the Second Circuit courts have recog-
nized that the defendant's confession need not be a "maternal
twin" with the confession of the codefendant.80 It is enough
under the law of the Second Circuit that the codefendants' con-
fessions are "[a]s to motive, plot and execution of the crime...
essentially the same, '"81 or that a statement made by a com-
plaining defendant interlocks on "all essential points" with the
codefendant's incriminating statement."2
The Second Circuit, like many state courts, has not ex-
pressly distinguished between a defendant's "confession" or
"statement." However, it has apparently required a defendant's
own statement to admit culpability to the same extent that a
codefendant's statement incriminates him.
The Second Circuit has not placed any restrictions on the
source of the defendant's own interlocking confession. For exam-
ple, in Tamilio v. Fogg,s3 the defendant was denied Bruton pro-
tection on the basis of a statement allegedly made to a fellow
prisoner after the two had been together for approximately five
minutes. Arguably, allowing a "prison confession" to preclude
Bruton protection is incompatible with the Parker plurality's ra-
tionale that a defendant's own confession is "probably the most
probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against
him. '8 4 The plurality's reasoning assumes that once the defend-
ant's own confession has been admitted at trial, the subsequent
78. United States ex rel. Catanzaro v. Mancusi, 404 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 942 (1970). See supra text accompanying notes 52-53.
79. See, e.g., Tamilio v. Fogg, 713 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 706
(1984); Kirksey v. Jones, 673 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1982); United States ex rel. Ortiz v. Fritz,
476 F.2d 37 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1075 (1973); United States ex rel. Catanzaro
v. Mancusi, 404 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 942 (1970); United States
v. Bethea, 505 F. Supp. 698 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); Forehead v. Fogg, 500 F. Supp. 851
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); Felton v. Harris, 482 F. Supp. 448 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
80. See United States ex rel. Stanbridge v. Zelker, 514 F.2d 45, 48 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 873 (1975); Forehead v. Fogg, 500 F. Supp. 851, 853 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
81. United States ex rel. Ortiz v. Fritz, 476 F.2d 37, 39 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1075 (1973). See also Felton v. Harris, 482 F. Supp. 448, 455 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
82. Tamilio v. Fogg, 713 F.2d 18, 20 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 706
(1984).
83. 713 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1983).
84. Parker, 442 U.S. at 72 (quoting Bruton, 391 U.S. at 139 (White, J., dissenting)).
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admission of the codefendant's incriminating statement will sel-
dom have the devastating effect at issue in Bruton.85 Of course,
the linchpin of this theory is that the defendant's own confes-
sion is reliable. It may be argued that jail house confessions lack
the requisite reliability to fall legitimately within the category of
an interlocking confession exception to Bruton.
The Second Circuit has noted the similarity between the
harmless error doctrine and the interlocking confession doc-
trine.86 In addition, the Second Circuit has applied the inter-
locking confession doctrine without defining the term "interlock-
ing confession" and without referencing the contents or the
similarity of the codefendants' statements."
Prior to Parker, the Catanzaro interlocking confession rule
was questioned within the Second Circuit itself. In United
States ex rel. Ortiz v. Fritz,"8 a panel consisting of Judges
Oakes, Friendly, and Timbers openly challenged the soundness
of Catanzaro. The panel, however, affirmed the district court's
decision because it felt bound to follow Catanzaro as the law of
the circuit.89 The court in Ortiz was disturbed by the failure of
the Catanzaro rationale" to address the "second underpinning
of Bruton," namely, the "inevitably suspect" nature of a code-
fendant's statement incriminating a defendant." As stated in
Ortiz, "Despite the defendant's own confession, the jury may
still look to the incriminating statements of a codefendant, or to
the cumulative impact of those statements coupled with the de-
fendant's own statements, to find the defendant's guilt-despite
the 'placebo' of curative instructions." 92 Certainly if the jury ac-
tually considers such evidence there is a sixth amendment viola-
85. Parker, 442 U.S. at 72-73.
86. Tamilio v. Fogg, 713 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1983). See also United States v. Be-
thea, 505 F. Supp. 698 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). In Bethea, the court stated: "[T]he theory of the
interlocking confession cases is essentially one of harmless error. If the major elements of
the crime are confessed by both defendants, there is little harm in having a co-defen-
dant's confirmation of the defendant's responsibility." Id. at 704 (citing Parker, 442 U.S.
62 (1979)).
87. See, e.g., Kirksey v. Jones, 673 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1982).
88. 476 F.2d 37 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1075 (1973).
89. Id. at 38-40.
90. Id. at 40. "The Catanzaro rationale is that the '"devastating" risk' that a jury
will not be able to disregard the codefendant's confession is not present when the defen-
dant's own confession is in evidence." Id. (citation and footnote omitted).
91. Id. at 40.
92. Id. at 40 (citation and footnote omitted).
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tion since the defendant has not been allowed to test the verac-
ity of the codefendant's statement by cross-examination.
A survey of the Second Circuit case law93 suggests that the
appellate results would have been the same under a harmless
error analysis. As will be shown below, this is not the case with
all the courts that have adopted the interlocking confession
doctrine.
Most circuits that have considered the issue continue to ap-
ply a harmless error analysis to situations involving incriminat-
ing statements by codefendants.94 One circuit court, noting the
four to four split in Parker, refused to choose the appropriate
analysis and instead upheld the conviction under both the plu-
rality and harmless error approaches. 5
B. The State Courts
The range of reaction to the Parker plurality opinion has
been much greater in state courts than in federal courts. Some
state courts have accepted the Parker plurality holding without
question as if it were binding precedent.96 Other courts, highly
critical of the Parker plurality opinion, have stated that it is of
no precedential value.97 Still other state courts, which adopted
the interlocking confession exception prior to Parker, continue
to use it post-Parker.9 Other courts blur the distinction be-
93. See supra note 79.
94. See, e.g., United States v. Ruff, 717 F.2d 855 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 733 (1984); United States v. Iron Thunder, 714 F.2d 765 (8th Cir. 1983); Poole v.
Perini, 659 F.2d 730 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 910 (1982); United States v.
Espericueta-Reyes, 631 F.2d 616 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Parker, 622 F.2d 298
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 851 (1980); Mayes v. Sowders, 621 F.2d 850 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 922 (1980).
95. Montes v. Jenkins, 626 F.2d 584 (7th Cir. 1980). See also Metropolis v. Turner,
437 F.2d 207 (10th Cir. 1971).
96. See State v. Gerlaugh, 134 Ariz. 164, 168, 654 P.2d 800, 804 (1982); United
States v. Jones, 438 A.2d 444, 446 (D.C. 1981)(dicta), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 918 (1982);
Damon v. State, 397 So. 2d 1224, 1225-26 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Fortner v. State, 248
Ga. 107, 108-09, 281 S.E.2d 533, 535-36 (1981); State v. Thompson, 279 S.C. 405, 407-08,
308 S.E.2d 364, 365-66 (1983); State v. Painter, 614 S.W.2d 86, 89 (Tenn. Crin. App.
1981).
97. See Quick v. State, 599 P.2d 712, 722-25 (Alaska 1979); State v. Rodriguez, 226
Kan. 558, 561-63, 601 P.2d 686, 689-90 (1979); State v. Bleyl, 435 A.2d 1349, 1362-63
(Me. 1981); Earhart v. State, 48 Md. App. 695, 697-706, 429 A.2d 557, 560-63 (1981).
98. See People v. Sanders, 103 Ill. App. 3d 700, 705-06, 431 N.E.2d 1145, 1150, cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 871 (1982); Commonwealth v. Bianco, 388 Mass. 358, 365, 446 N.E.2d
19851
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tween the harmless error approach and the interlocking confes-
sion doctrine.99 Finally, a significant number of state courts have
preferred to follow Justice Blackmun's harmless error analysis
even in those cases in which the defendant has made a self-in-
criminating statement.100
Before looking more closely at the state courts' reactions to
Parker, it is worth recalling the concerns voiced by Justice
Blackmun in his Parker concurrence."' On the one hand, he
thought that the interlocking confession exception to Bruton,
endorsed by the plurality, might just be a shift in analysis, that
is, a shift from a focus on the question of whether the error in-
volved was harmless to an inquiry as to whether the codefend-
ants' confessions were interlocking to such an extent that
Bruton did not apply.102 This shift of focus would not neces-
sarily change the net result as long as the degree of interlock
required was such that any error would also be harmless.10 3 On
1041, 1046 (1983); People v. Berzups, 49 N.Y.2d 417, 425-26, 402 N.E.2d 1155, 1158-59,
426 N.Y.S.2d 253, 256-57 (1980); State v. Gray, 628 S.W.2d 746, 749 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1982).
99. See State v. Bleyl, 435 A.2d 1349, 1365 (Me. 1981); State v. Elwell, 380 A.2d
1016, 1021 n.5 (Me. 1977); People v. Hartford, 117 Mich. App. 413, 418-20, 324 N.W.2d
31, 34 (1982).
100. See State v. Moritz, 63 Ohio St. 2d 150, 155-56, 407 N.E.2d 1268, 1272 (1980).
See also supra cases cited in note 97.
101. 442 U.S. at 77-81.
102. Id. at 78-80.
103. For example, consider the following two statements:
Defendant X: Me and Y decided to rob the 7-11. Y drove the car and I went in
with a gun and got money from the clerk.
Defendant Y: Me and X decided to rob the 7-11. I waited in the car. X went
into the store and came running out. We drove to my place and split the
money.
Suppose X and Y are tried jointly for armed robbery and both their statements are
admitted. Obviously redaction would not successfully conceal the nondeclarant's identity
in either statement. Under the Parker plurality approach both statements would be ad-
missible with proper limiting instructions as interlocking confessions. The result would
be the same on appeal if the harmless error analysis were applied since both X and Y
have admitted their guilt as to all the essential elements of the crime.
In contrast, consider the following two statements:
Defendant X: Y and I decided to rob the 7-11. Y drove the car and I went in
with a gun and got money from the clerk. Y drove the getaway car.
Defendant Y: I'd been to a party with X. We were going home and stopped at
the 7-11 to get cigarettes. I waited for X to get the cigarettes and when he
came out we went to his house and listened to classical music-Le Sacre du
Printemps by Stravinsky, I believe. X paid me some money that he owed me.
Here, the defendants' statements interlock in some respects, but not with respect to the
20
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the other hand, Justice Blackmun noted with concern that the
plurality itself had not truly inquired into the existence of an
adequate interlock between the codefendants' statements but,
rather, had assumed the existence of an interlock. Justice Black-
mun acknowledged that the plurality came "close to saying that
so long as all the defendants have made some type of confession
which is placed in evidence, Bruton is inapplicable without in-
quiry into whether the confessions actually interlock and the ex-
tent thereof.'1 0 4 As will be shown below, some state courts fol-
lowing the Parker plurality have reacted in a manner that is
primarily a shift in focus while other courts have assumed suffi-
cient interlock in some questionable situations.
Although the Parker plurality is not binding precedent on
the states, 105 several state courts have followed the plurality
opinion without question.106 These states' judicial implementa-
tion of the interlocking confession doctrine espoused by the
Parker plurality varies considerably. The reach of the Parker
plurality's exception to the Bruton rule depends, of course, on
the definitions of "interlocking" and "confession." The Parker
plurality, however, neglected to define these terms and, conse-
quently, that task has been left to the lower courts. By examin-
ing the working definitions used by the courts, one can gauge to
a certain extent the scope of the "interlocking confession doc-
trine" in a given jurisdiction.
In Tennessee, for example, the inquiry appears to be
whether "the confession of one non-testifying codefendant con-
tradicts, repudiates, or adds to material statements in the con-
fession of the other non-testifying codefendant, so as to expose
the latter to an increased risk of conviction or to an increase in
the degree of the offense with correspondingly greater punish-
ment. 10 7 If a nontestifying codefendant's confession fits within
material elements of the crime. Whether the result in this example would be the same
regardless of whether a harmless error analysis or an interlocking confession inquiry were
used would depend on the degree of interlock required by a reviewing court.
104. Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 80 (1979).
105. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S.
188, 192 (1972); State v. Rodriguez, 226 Kan. 558, 565, 601 P.2d 686, 690 (1979); State v.
Bleyl, 435 A.2d 1349, 1363 (Me. 1981).
106. See supra note 96.
107. State v. Gray, 628 S.W.2d 746, 749 (Tenn. Crm. App. 1982) (quoting State v.
Elliott, 524 S.W.2d 473, 478 (Tenn. 1975)).
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this category, Bruton would be applicable; otherwise Bruton
would not be applicable, and the codefendant confession that in-
criminated a self-confessing defendant would, with appropriate
limiting instructions, be admissible. Given the Tennessee defini-
tional requirements for interlocking confessions, it is likely that
all cases in which the codefendants' confessions are found to be
interlocking will also be cases in which harmless error would be
found should that analysis be used. This same phenomenon can
be seen in other jurisdictions which require that the codefend-
ants' confessions agree with respect to the material elements of
the crime in order for Bruton not to apply. 08
Some state courts have expressly recognized an overlap be-
tween the harmless error and interlocking confession doc-
trines. 100 In State v. Elwell,"0 the Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine agreed with the Tenth Circuit's determination in Metrop-
olis v. Turner"' that the distinction between no Bruton viola-
tion and a harmless violation was a "legal nicety."" 2 The Maine
Court summarized its analysis as follows: "[S]uffice it to say,
when interlocking confessions are admitted, Bruton does not re-
quire reversal.""13 The Maine court, however, has recognized the
relative disutility of the harmless error analysis in the pretrial
context. The court has therefore endorsed the interlocking con-
fession doctrine as an analytical tool to decide pretrial motions
for severance in the trial court.1
14
In contrast to courts that have been somewhat restrictive in
their definition of "interlocking confession," and thus in their
108. See, e.g., State v. Mata, 125 Ariz. 233, 238, 609 P.2d 48, 53 (1980)("[T]he con-
fessions of the Mata brothers did interlock in that they were consistent on the major
elements of the crime and there was nothing in Alonzo's confession that implicated the
defendant any more in the commission of the crime than did his own confession.").
109. See supra note 99.
110. 380 A.2d 1016 (Me. 1977).
111. 437 F.2d 207 (10th Cir. 1971).
112. Id. at 208.
113. State v. Elwell, 380 A.2d 1016, 1021 n.5 (Me. 1977). See also State v. Bleyl, 435
A.2d 1349 (Me. 1981). A slightly different analysis is suggested in People v. Miller, 88
Mich. App. 210, 276 N.W.2d 558 (1979), reu'd on other grounds, 411 Mich. 321, 307
N.W.2d 335 (1981). There, the court stated, "Where the various confessions are inter-
locking or substantially similar, the 'powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statements of
a codefendant' are not present as in Bruton, and, hence, it is harmless error at most to
admit such statements." 88 Mich. App. at 221, 276 N.W.2d at 563 (citations omitted).
Accord People v. Hartford, 117 Mich. App. 413, 324 N.W.2d 31 (1982).
114. State v. Bleyl, 435 A.2d 1349, 1363 (Me. 1981).
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application of the interlocking confession exception to Bruton,
are courts that have tended either to assume the existence of an
"interlocking confession" or to broadly define the term. Georgia
and South Carolina case law illustrate the development of what
might be called the "somewhat similar statement" doctrine.
The Georgia Supreme Court initially applied Parker in Cas-
per v. State"5 in 1979." e The court in Casper interpreted the
Parker plurality's opinion as holding that "no denial of confron-
tation occurs when the confessions of all defendants in the joint
trial are admitted."' 1 7 In Casper, as in Parker, no definition of
"interlocking confession" was offered. Of the three codefendants
in Casper, two had signed written "confessions" and one had
made an "incriminating statement" to a police officer. The court
in Casper, however, neither mentioned the contents of nor dis-
tinguished between the "confessions" or "statement.""' 8
Without formulating a clear distinction between "confes-
sions" and "statements," the Georgia Supreme Court in Casper
hypothesized a novel definition of "interlocking." The confes-
sions and statement in Casper had been edited, or redacted, by
the trial court in an attempt to comply with the requirements of
Bruton by deleting the names of nondeclarant defendants. The
supreme court apparently reasoned that since the redaction was
unsuccessful, in that a jury listening to the three "confessions"
could still discern the identity of the defendants even after dele-
tion of their names, the confessions were in fact
"interlocking."" 9
This apparent definitional requirement for an "interlock-
ing" confession was reasserted by the Georgia court two years
later in Fortner v. State.12 0 In Fortner the court distinguished
Bruton and determined that the case before it was similar to
Parker, which was characterized by the Georgia court as follows:
115. 244 Ga. 689, 261 S.E.2d 629 (1979).
116. It is unclear to what extent the Georgia courts may have adopted the interlock-
ing confession doctrine prior to Parker. Compare Gamarra v. State, 142 Ga. App. 196,
197, 235 S.E.2d 652, 654 (1977)("There is no Bruton violation, however, when the testi-
mony presented in the co-defendant's confession is supported by the complaining de-
fendant's own confession.") with Baker v. State, 238 Ga. 389, 233 S.E.2d 347
(1977)(harmless error analysis applied).
117. 244 Ga. at 691, 261 S.E.2d at 631.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. 248 Ga. 107, 281 S.E.2d 533 (1981).
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In Parker, the three defendants in issue were tried jointly, con-
fessions of all three were admitted as having been freely and
voluntarily given, with the names of the other two defendants
redacted . . ., the confessions were interlocking (i.e., corrobo-
rated each other, leaving no doubt in the jurors' minds con-
cerning the other persons referred to), and the trial court in-
structed the jury that each confession could be considered only
as against its maker and not against the other defendants. 2 '
In view of the fact that Bruton allows the use at trial of incrimi-
nating nontestifying codefendant statements only if they can be
effectively redacted so as not to incriminate another defendant,
it is troubling that Casper and Fortner appear to immunize
from Bruton protection those statements which cannot be effec-
tively redacted. This aspect of the Georgia case law might be
less troubling if it were coupled with a requirement that the co-
defendants' confessions agree with respect to all material ele-
ments of the crime. Examination of the codefendants' state-
ments in Fortner, however, shows that no such requirement
exists.
122
Georgia has also addressed the question of whether the in-
terlocking confession doctrine extends to incriminating state-
ments made by codefendants. 23 Relying in part on a reference
to "incriminating statements" in the Parker plurality opinion,
the Georgia court in Tatum v. State124 rejected a defense argu-
ment that Parker applies only when the defendant has con-
fessed, and not when he has made an incriminating statement.
25
The court noted that seldom will a defendant's statement con-
tain direct admissions as to each element of the crime. The court
interpreted Parker "to require only that the confessions or in-
criminating statements of co-defendants be interlocking to a
substantial degree. Juries are expected to heed limiting instruc-
121. Id. at 108-09, 281 S.E.2d at 535.
122. See Fortner, 248 Ga. at 108 n.2, 281 S.E.2d at 535 n.2.
123. Georgia's first opportunity to decide this question was presented in Casper v.
State, 244 Ga. 689, 261 S.E.2d 629 (1979), but the court avoided the issue by stating, "If
a distinction is to be drawn between a confession and an incriminating statement, then
the admission of the confessions as against [the defendant] who also made a statement,
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt ... ." 244 Ga. at 691, 261 S.E.2d at 631 (citing
Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969)).
124. 249 Ga. 422, 291 S.E.2d 701 (1982).
125. Id. at 425, 291 S.E.2d at 704 (citing Parker, 442 U.S. at 73).
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tions, and slight disparities in the statements of co-defendants
rarely, if ever, will be so prejudicial as to require exclusion under
the Bruton rule.'
'1 26
An examination of the case law reveals to what extent
"slight" disparities might be allowed under the Georgia Supreme
Court's interpretation of Parker.127 For example, in Fortner v.
State, there were three codefendants. Two codefendants, Riley
and McCluskey, were convicted of murder and armed robbery;
Fortner was convicted of felony murder. All three claimed
Bruton error as to the admission at trial of the other codefend-
ants' confessions. The court found Parker controlling, and thus
that no sixth amendment violation existed. The substance of the
defendants' statements is summarized below.
FORTNER STATEMENT: McCluskey was driving Fortner
and Riley around in Fortner's car when they decided to use
Riley's gun to get money.
RILEY STATEMENT: Riley was influenced by McCluskey to
commit the robbery. The gun cocked and discharged when the
victim grabbed Riley.
McCLUSKEY STATEMENT: The three defendants were rid-
ing around for another purpose when Riley demanded that
McCluskey stop the car. Riley announced that he was going
back to the Magik Mart phone booth where the three defend-
ants had seen a man standing. When Riley returned he said he
had shot a man.128
Certainly one may doubt the truthfulness of McCluskey's
statement standing on its own. The fact is, however, that al-
though he did not admit participating in either the armed rob-
bery or the murder, McCluskey was seriously implicated in both
crimes by his codefendants' confessions. Even so the court char-
acterized the statements as "clearly interlocking. ' 12 Given the
126. 249 Ga. at 425, 291 S.E.2d at 704. It should be noted that nowhere in the inter-
locking confession analysis proposed by the Georgia court is there a mechanism by which
the "rare" prejudicial case can be separated from the standard interlocking confession
case, unless a harmless error inquiry lurks beneath the express inquiry as to whether a
substantial degree of interlock exists.
127. See, e.g., Tatum v. State, 249 Ga. 422, 291 S.E.2d 701 (1982); Fortner v. State,
248 Ga. 107, 281 S.E.2d 533 (1981); Edwards v. State, 162 Ga. App. 216, 290 S.E.2d 553
(1982).
128. 248 Ga. 107, 108 n.2, 281 S.E.2d 533, 535 n.2 (1981).
129. Id. at 109, 281 S.E.2d at 536.
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rationale of Bruton, it seems strange to distinguish the situation
in Fortner, in which McCluskey's statement corroborated those
of his codefendants only with respect to the fact that the three
were in the same car, from a hypothetical situation in which Mc-
Cluskey had never given the police a statement. In the latter
situation, Bruton would apply even in Georgia, and presumably,
it would preclude the admission of the codefendants' statements
because there would be no statement by the defendant capable
of interlocking with those of the codefendants.
Fortner is one example from Georgia of what this writer will
call the "somewhat similar statement" exception to Bruton.5 0
Another example is State v. Thompson,"31 the case in which the
South Carolina Supreme Court ostensibly adopted the Parker
plurality's holding.
Sallie Thompson was accused and convicted of being an ac-
cessory before and after the fact to murder. The victim was ap-
pellant's husband, and the accused murderer, appellant's code-
fendant, was her lover.132 Both Thompson and her codefendant,
Dennis McCurry, gave statements to the police which the trial
court admitted along with limiting instructions. 33 The South
Carolina Supreme Court upheld the trial court's determination
that the "confessions" of the two defendants were "interlocking"
under Parker.3 4 The supreme court found that there was an in-
terlock because "[t]he statements of appellant and her co-defen-
dant support each other in several respects." '35 It is equally true,
however, that the two statements differed significantly with re-
spect to the elements of the crimes with which Thompson had
been charged. 36
130. See also Edwards v. State, 162 Ga. App. 216, 290 S.E.2d 553 (1982). For addi-
tional information on the statements involved in Edwards, see Tatum v. State, 249 Ga.
422, 291 S.E.2d 701 (1982)(Tatum and Edwards were codefendants).
131. 279 S.C. 405, 308 S.E.2d 364 (1983). For a discussion of Thompson, see Crimi-
nal Law, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 36 S.C.L. REv. 71, 103 (1984).
132. 279 S.C. at 406, 308 S.E.2d at 365.
133. Id. at 407, 308 S.E.2d at 366. Thompson's statement was redacted by the trial
court at the point she stated that McCurry, having just told her that he had shot her
husband, told her "but I believe I made it look like a suicide." Record at 108. This
statement conflicted with McCurry's statement which claimed the shooting had been an
accident. See Record at 115.
134. 279 S.C. at 407, 308 S.E.2d at 366.
135. Id.
136. In determining that a sufficient interlock existed in Thompson, the South Car-
olina Supreme Court wrote:
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The South Carolina and Georgia cases discussed above are
[Both defendants admit] to having discussed the murder of appellants hus-
band. Each states that McCurry told appellant that he planned to kill appel-
lant's husband immediately prior to the crime. According to both accounts,
McCurry hid in appellant's bedroom after the murder. Although appellant's
statement emphasizes her fear of McCurry, McCurry's statement suggests the
shooting was accidental. However, this discrepancy was not so significant as to
require exclusion of the statements.
Id. at 407, 308 S.E.2d at 366.
Below is a breakdown of the actual statements in Thompson upon which the court
based its finding that the statements were interlocking and thus admissible under
Parker.
Court: Each [defendant] admits to having discussed the murder of appellants
husband. [279 S.C. 407, 308 S.E.2d 366 (1983).]
Sallie Thompson: Then Dennis told me about killing Steve, he asked me about
it. He said "it looks like the only way I'm going to get you is to kill Steve,
because you are not going to leave him." . . . I thought I loved Dennis, I
thought I loved Steve too. I was torn between two people. Dennis started ask-
ing me about killing Steve, and I told him no. The more Dennis talked about
it, and kept after me about it, I started telling him, "I just don't know Dennis,
I just don't know."... Dennis rode hard about killing Steve. I thought if I
told him I just didn't know, he would leave me alone .... Well, he kept asking
me when to do it, when to kill him. I told him that I didn't want to have no
part in a killing, that we would both go to jail ... Dennis had told me he
could kill Steve at the Tan Yard .... Dennis had kept after me about killing
Steve. I told Dennis "if you are going to do it, I don't want to know about it." I
guess this was about a week before Steve was shot. I was pretty sure of the
fact, by this time, that Dennis could commit a murder. [Record at 107-08.]
Dennis McCurry: [Sallie and I] talked about if Steve wasn't around we would
get married .... We was just talking about it, just aggravating each
other.... Me and Sally had talked about getting Steve out of the way. [Rec-
ord at 112.]
Court: Each [defendant] state[d] that McCurry told appellant that he planned
to kill appellant's husband immediately prior to the crime. [279 S.C. 407, 308
S.E.2d 366 (1983).]
Sallie Thompson: Dennis told me "You know I am going to kill him tonight?"
I said, "Yes." I didn't believe he would do it. [Record at 108.]
Dennis McCurry: Sally asked me if I was going to do it tonight. I thought she
was joking. I said yea, I probably will. [Record at 113.]
It seems clear from a review of both statements that McCurry's statement incrimi-
nated Thompson to an extent far beyond her own. As in Parker and Bruton, the issue in
Thompson was not whether McCurry's statement was admissible against Thompson; ob-
viously it was not. The issue was whether the jury could reasonably be expected to follow
the court's instruction that it consider the McCurry statement only with respect to its
declarant. Had Sallie Thompson never made a statement to the police she would have
been unquestionably entitled to Bruton protection. Query whether the statement made
by Thompson was such that "the defendant's case ha[d] already been devastated by
[her] own extrajudicial confession of guilt," thereby justifying the application of the gen-
eral rule that juries will follow instructions and not the "Bruton exception." Parker, 442
U.S. at 75 n.7 (Rehnquist, J., plurality).
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instructive as to the possible reach of the interlocking confession
doctrine. But for the rubric "interlocking confession," appellants
in cases such as Fortner and Thompson would have received the
protection provided by Bruton. These were not cases in which
the defendant's case had been "devastated by his own extra-ju-
dicial confession of guilt,"13 7 the factor which ostensibly pro-
pelled the Parker plurality to distinguish interlocking cases from
those governed by Bruton.
It would be pure speculation to comment on whether the
appellants in Thompson and Fortner would have been afforded
greater protection of their confrontation rights had the appellate
courts followed the Parker concurrence and dissent's harmless
error analysis. As the case below suggests, it would be naive and
simplistic to characterize the harmless error standard as the
great protector of defendants' sixth amendment rights"3" and the
interlocking confession doctrine as the diminisher of those same
rights.
In Hendrix v. Smith,139 an armed robbery case, two state
courts and a federal district court had found a Bruton violation
to be harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt before the Sec-
ond Circuit finally reversed. The district court in Hendrix deter-
mined that "[t]he strength of the eyewitness identification,
which was not challenged in any material respect.., and which
the jury accepted, [made] the case an appropriate one for appli-
cation of the harmless error standard."14 Such a finding failed
to take into account the credibility of the eyewitness testimony
or the corroborative effect of the codefendant's statement in-
criminating the defendant. The district court presumed that the
jury was ultimately persuaded by the untainted eyewitness testi-
mony without regard to the tainted statement by the codefend-
ant.'M  The court in Hendrix indulged in a presumption, seen in
137. Parker, 442 U.S. at 75 n.7 (Rehnquist, J., plurality).
138. See, e.g., Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 256-57 (1969)(Brennan, J., dis-
senting). See generally Goldberg, Harmless Error: Constitutional Sneak Thief, 71 J.
CaM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421 (1980).
139. 639 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'g, 494 F. Supp. 314 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). See also
People v. Hendrix, 56 A.D.2d 580, 391 N.Y.S.2d 186 (1977), aff'd by memorandum order,
44 N.Y.2d 658, 376 N.E.2d 192, 405 N.Y.S.2d 31 (1978).
140. 494 F. Supp. 314, 318 (E.D.N.Y. 1980)(emphasis added).
141. The district court's analysis brings to mind the concern of the dissent in Har-
rington v. California that "the focus of appellate inquiry should be on the character and
quality of the tainted evidence as it relates to the untainted evidence and not just on the
[Vol. 36
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many harmless error cases, that the proper evidence was both
credible and persuasive to the trial jury.
Oddly enough, although three courts of review had found
harmless error in Hendrix, the court of appeals held that it was
"clear that absent [codefendant's] statement, the independent
evidence of appellant's guilt is not so overwhelming that the
conviction must stand. 1' 4 2 The circuit court focused on the fact
that the victim who gave the eyewitness testimony had been pre-
viously convicted of murdering a police officer, a crime of moral
turpitude. 1 3 Further, there was testimony by witnesses for the
defense that the victim had approached certain individuals ask-
ing for money in exchange for his dropping the charges against
Mr. Hendrix, and offering to pay a defense witness to testify for
the prosecution.144 Thus, the Hendrix case demonstrates how
the constitutional protection afforded a defendant may fluctuate
when harmless error analysis is used by a reviewing court.
It is probably fair to conclude that the extent of sixth
amendment protections afforded codefendants in joint trials
when one nontestifying defendant has made a statement that in-
criminates another defendant is governed not so much by
whether a court applies the so-called interlocking confession
doctrine or whether it applies a harmless error standard of re-
view. Rather, the extent of protection afforded the defendant's
confrontation rights depends on the rigorousness with which an
appellate court applies either standard. 145
amount of untainted evidence." Harrington, 395 U.S. 250, 256 (1969).
142. Hendrix v. Smith, 639 F.2d 113, 116-17 (2d Cir. 1981).
143. Id. at 116.
144. 494 F. Supp. at 316 ("Eartha Crowell testified that Henry Jefferson [the vic-
tim] called her and offered her $50 to testify.... Judy Lawrence testified that Elroy
[the petitioner] was not at the party on the night of the crime and that she had a conver-
sation with Henry Jefferson in which he told her that he would drop the charges if they
paid him $2,000 or $2,500.").
145. Two examples of stringent appellate review are found in United States v. Iron
Thunder, 714 F.2d 765 (8th Cir. 1983), and State v. Rodriguez, 226 Kan. 558, 601 P.2d
686 (1979). In both cases the complaining defendant made a somewhat incriminating
statement, but both courts closely examined the codefendant's statement to determine
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V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's failure in Parker v. Randolph to ei-
ther fashion or reject as constitutionally impermissible an inter-
locking confession exception to Bruton has exacerbated what
was already a serious lack of consensus in the lower courts.
Worse, the Parker plurality's failure to explicitly define what it
meant by "interlocking confession" has allowed courts, which so
choose, to violate the spirit and holding of Bruton by ostensibly
following the Parker plurality's holding.
Kathleen A. Lord
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